Consider a parallel between patient-physician and physician-nurse relationships. It might be argued that a physician who delegates to a nurse the administration of a lethal dose of morphine to a terminally ill patient avoids responsibility. He should give the lethal injection himself, as doctors in the Netherlands do. This view is contentious. In a health care team, in which each member knows the patient and the decision is a shared one, it may be appropriate for a nurse to give the injection, if she is willing. But a doctor would be avoiding responsibility if he made the decision to end the patient's life and asked a nurse to perform such a procedure without a written order. He must act so as to set the ball rolling. In the patient-physician relationship, it is the patient who must perform this initial act. We need a reliable signal of resolve. That signal is action. As a reliable barometer of resolve, actions speak louder than words.
Making choices Another major theme that percolates through several essays is that patients should make choices when they are competent about when and how they want to die. Battin objects to our passive acquiescence, accepting the "favourably regarded" progression to death: aggressive initial treatment, followed by palliative care, withdrawal and withholding of care and finally do not resuscitate orders. "Dying in 559 beds: efficiency, 'best buys', and the ethics of standardisation in national health care" argues that both national health services and free market systems preclude a person "having a death of one's own". It is only when a person makes active choices about death that death can be good for the person whose death it is ("Euthanasia: the fundamental issues").
Active choice has other advantages. We have already seen how making choices to limit treatment would save scarce resources. It would also facilitate altruism. As patients become incompetent, they are treated according to what is in their best interests. Yet if they were competent, they might make altruistic choices. They might choose to die earlier for the sake of their family or others. Such an altruistic choice cannot be made by surrogates. Hence, not making one's own choices during times of competence precludes altruism ("The eclipse of altruism: the moral costs of deciding for others").
An important instrument of active choice is the advance directive. Battin expresses reservations about these (pages 161-2). However, she argues that completing an advance directive is the most realistic way of limiting treatment to patients with Alzheimer's disease.
Valuing the lives of competent patients If we are to permit assisted suicide or AVE, we need a clear procedure for valuing the lives of competent patients. We need a clear sense of who has a good reason to die and who does not. What makes continued life good for a person? Is the value of life subjective, relative to that person's own evaluation of its worth? Or is it objective, independent of that person's own evaluation of its worth? On one simple version of a subjective conception of value, continued life is good if the person whose life it is believes that it is worth living. Continued life is of value on an objective conception if it has some objective quality, such as the capacity to experience meaningfuil human relationships. My own opinion is that such evaluations must take the objective perspective. My one major disappointment with The Least Worst Death is that Battin is unclear about how we should value the lives of competent patients. Indeed, at times she offers apparently conflicting views.
At some points, Battin appears sympathetic to subjective evaluation. Thus she writes that whether continued life is a benefit or a burden "is a function of subjective preference and choice" (page 106). Battin claims that "when a suffering person is conscious enough to have an experience at all, whether that experience counts as a benefit overriding the suffering or not is relative to that person and can be decided ultimately only by him or her" (page 106). "We cannot objectively determine whether life is a benefit to a person" (page 107).
Subjective evaluation results in the collapse of a principle of mercy (beneficence) into respect for autonomy. If I desire to die, then on a subjective conception of the value of life, my life is not worth living. Battin claims that "... the principle of mercy is conceptually tied to that of autonomy ..." (page 107). But It also fails to take account of the fact that people can be mistaken about the value of their life. We have no hesitation in saying that some lives of incompetent people are worth living. For example, John has mild retardation but lives a happy and productive life, has many friends, and so on. Imagine some new treatment improves his cognitive abilities. He becomes competent. But he now also more clearly sees the negative aspects of his life. He comes to judge it not worth living. The life itself -the experiences, the relations, and so onhave not changed. Why change our evaluation of the life? It is more plausible to say that John is mistaken in his evaluation.
Battin suggests that a person is the best judge of the value of his life (page 107). That may be true. But it does not imply that he is an incorrigible judge. Nor does it mean that the value of his life is relative to his own judgment.
In places, Battin seems sympathetic to this objectivist view. Thus she writes, "... [T] he principle of autonomy is dependent on the principle of mercy in certain sorts of case" (page 111). "When there is no evidence of suffering or pain, mental or physical, and no other evidence of factors like depression, psychoactive drugs, or affect-altering disease that might impair cognitive functioning, an external observer can accurately determine whether life is a benefit: unless the person has an overriding commitment to a principle or a cause that requires sacrifice of that life, life is a benefit to him or her" (page I I 1).
However, Battin has reservations about full commitment to objective evaluation. If a person chooses death rather than pain, Battin claims that we cannot demand "independent, objective evidence" that death is better than pain. The incessantly pain-racked person is better placed than anyone else to make such an evaluation, given her intimate acquaintance with the pain and her own beliefs and fears about death (page 111).
Indeed, Battin appears hostile to the offering of advice about the value of life. She has admiration for Freitod, which she describes as "a solitary, profoundly individual choice" (page 265). Battin objects to those with terminal disease, severe disability or old age being directively counselled not to suicide or be killed (pages 174-5, 271-2). She believes counselling should be non-directive, exploring a person's desire to die. Battin could be interpreted as claiming that an individual is often best placed to make judgments of the value of his own life. He should be assisted to make the best judgment possible. Advisors should be aware of their own limitations in determining the relevant features of a person's particular situation. However, if this is her argument, it is not an argument against directive counselling per se, but against ill-founded or overambitious directive counselling.
Although decisions at the end of life are deeply difficult, we do believe that there is a place for directive advice about whether to live or not. A rebel captured by a vicious, suppressive regime might be given a cyanide pill by a sympathetic guard. "Tomorrow, you will experience unspeakable tortures," the guard explains. "You should take this pill now. You will be better off dead." Such advice is not out of place and may be right. Sometimes, others do know what is best.
Free choice need not be solitary. One's death is not unfree if one receives considered counsel, advice or argument about what is best. Indeed, to make a fully rational choice or a choice which is positively free, one needs to evaluate not only information, but the arguments of others as to which is the best course. Perhaps rationality does not require that a person agree with others, but it does require that he at least consider the plausible arguments of others.
Battin is concerned that people will be manipulated into killing themselves by others promoting objective ideals of the worth of life, or "ideological manipulation". This concern should not be so great as to push us to subjectivism. The 
